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In

the past half of a century the American labor movement has

emerged as one of the powerful forces dominating American life.

From

a position little more than peripheral in 1933, when its three million
members were largely confined to skilled trades in relatively isolated
or protected parts of the economy, the organized labor movement has
expanded until collective bargaining has become a recognized and well
established procedure in virtually every industry (Seidman, London,
Karsh, & Tagliacazzo, 1958}.

Collective bargaining relates to outcomes

which concern the worker's individual relationship to the organization,
such as hours and conditions of work, rates of pay, seniority, promotions, etc.

(Sayles & Strauss, 1967).

Scattered efforts to form trade unions were made early in the
nineteenth century, and by the close of the century the American Federation of Labor was well established in a number of skilled crafts.

Yet

until the 1930's union-management relations outside these crafts were
highly unstable.

Though unskilled workers sometimes joined unions

in times of prosperity, they abandoned them when hard times returned.

This pattern began to change drastically during the Great Depression
of the 1930's when relatively large permanent trade union membership
emerged not only in the traditional crafts where workers had found it
easier to organize, but also in mass production industry (Strauss &
Sayles, 1972).
The fundamental change in our basic labor law, established by the
passage of the National Labor Relations or Wagner Act in 1935, laid
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the legal foundation for the organizations of millions of workers in the
mass production and other less-skilled industries; and the organizing
drives first of the CIO and then of the AFL, taking advantage of this
opportunity provided the impetus for the mass movement into unionism
(Seidman, London, Karsh, & Tagliacazzo, 1958).

The full employment of

the war and postwar periods, combined with the rising level of prices
and the ample profits earned by employers, provided an economic environment favorable to the growth of nnionism (Seidman, London, Karsh,

&

Tagliacazzo, 1958; Strauss & Sayles, 1972).
After World \var II, nnion growth began to slow down.

Membership

reached its peak in the mid-1950's and then began to decline.

The pro-

portion of workers in easy-to-organize industries began to decline.
From 1953 to the early 1960's the economy slowed down ~tile technological change occurred at a rapid rate (Strauss & Sayles, 1972).

Manufac-

turing employment as a whole fell off, and the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947 and Landrum Griffin Act in 1959 presented further
barriers to union growth by restricting the use of the secondary boycott.
Since 1965, union membership has begun to increase again, at least
in absolute numbers (Strauss & Sayles, 1972).

Currently, of the entire

U.S. \'larking population, approximately one-fourth is unionized.

Some

members are attracted to or committed to their union and identify with
it more than others, but there is no doubt that for a substantial part
of the working population, union membership plays an important role in
its working life {Chamberlain & Cullen, 1971; Rosen, 1975; Strauss,
1963).

It most certainly affects the outcomes which accrue from work-
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ing, and it may very well affect people's perceptions of and attitudes
towards work and actual work behavior (Hammer, 1978).
In recent years there has been a renewed interest among researchers

in employees' attitudes toward unions (Hammer, 1978; Hamner & Smith,

1978; Herman, 1973; Smith, 1977), their decisions to join unions (Getman, Goldberg & Herman, 1976; Strauss & Sayles, 1972), and their support of union militant activities (Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Rosen, 1975).
The effects of union membership, however, have not received much attention since the "dual loyaltyn research of the 1950 1 s, which tested the
hypothesis that positive attitudes toward the union would lead to negative attitudes toward the employer (Dean, 1954; Kerr, 1954; Purcell,
1954; Stagner, 1954}.

From both earlier research and recent work, we

know of reasons why people join unions, but we have very little information on the impact of union membership on employee motivation, performance and attitudes (Hammer, 1978).
In the field of organizational behavior, theories and research on

worker performance and attitudes have largely ignored the role of the
union as a potential contributor to indices of organizational effectiveness (Hammer, 1978).

Theories of worker motivation and attitude forma-

tion focus on the interaction between an individual 1 s need structure and
the employing organization 1 s formal and informal reward systems, organizational structure and job designs (Friedlander, 1964; Hackman & Lawler,
1971; Herman, Dunhan & Hulin, 1975;

I~,

Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosen-

thal, 1964; Lawler, 1973; Lawler & Hall, 1970; Porter and Lawler, 1965}.
Performance, tardiness, absenteeism and turnover are explained in terms
of behavior-outcome contingencies set up by the employer through per-
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personnel policies, supervision, technology and hierarchial structure,
and by co-workers through their sanctioning of specific actions (Hammer, 1978).

It is the purpose of this paper to argue for expanding re-

search of the impact of unions on worker perceptions and attitudes and
to describe the effects of union membership on worker's reactions to
their conditions of employment.
For American labor, union memberShip has come to mean pay

increase~

better working conditions, job security and protection (Chamberlain &
Cullen, 1971; Rees, 1962}.

Workersr intentions to join in collective

action vis-a-vis an employer are based heavily on people's expectations
~Lat

unions will improve their ability to obtain valued outcomes (Ham-

mer, 1978).

While there are universal expectations of greater outcome

attainment within organized labor, the ability of unions to achieve
worker goals tlurough the collective bargaining process varies widely
across industries (Kochan & Block, 1977) and over time (Rees, 1962).

If

Darwin's laws are applicable to unions as they are to biological organisms; one would expect that the stronger the union, the more it can ob-

tain for its members (which is the reason for its existence} and the
more members' attitudes and behaviors might be influenced by it (Hammer,
1978}.
The present study proposes to examine relationShips between local
union characteristics and workers' perceptions of outcomes, attitudes
about their job and job satisfaction.

Members of local unions of retail

store workers, working in the same industry will be tlLe subjects involved.

Until recently, little study has been attempted with regard

to tlLe local union, the basic structural unit in which the membership is
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found (Sayles & Strauss, 1967).

Yet, this is the only union world that

the rank and file member knows.

The local unions in the present study

will vary in strength

(bargai~ing

power) and the hypotheses to be tested

will use union strength as the independent variable.
ments supporting union strength-employee reactions

Before the argu-

(perceptions, atti-

tudes and job satisfaction) are presented the operational definitions
of the union strength variable will be discussed.
Vnion Strength
Union strength has been defined as those activities and organizational attributes which allow the union to achieve its goals
Wheeler, 1975).

(Kochan &

Sources of union strength are usually identified as the

strike, the slowdown, the

use of union labels to control product markets,

control over the labor supply through limited access to membership status, and the use of closed shops (Rees, 1962).

The traditional opera-

tional definition of this concept among labor economists has been the
percentage of workers in an industry who are unionized or covered under
collective bargaining agree~ents

(Lewis, 1963).

This union density in-

dex is not without its problems, because it assumes that there is a linear relationship between the percent of an industry•s labor market contained in the local union and the ability of that union to attain valued
outcomes for its members

(Kochan & Wheeler, 1975).

This relationship

has not been found to be linear, as union density seems to be affected
by the educational level of the work force and the geographical concentration of a given industry (Rosen, 1969).

Block and Kuskin (1978) found

\

that nonunion sector wages are generally more responsive to individual
worker levels of education and experience and regional price ana level
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variation.

Baskin (1977) found that relative wages of union and non-

union workers varies by race, sex, location and occupation.
more, union power

l~as

Further-

been found to increase with greater organizational

strength (Rosen, 1969).

Within a given industry there are wide varia-

tions in the range of outcomes (such as wages, fringe benefits, seniority clauses, working conditions} achieved by different local unions
(Hammer, 1978).

Therefore, percent organized is a contaminated measure

of union strength.
It has been suggested, based on research data, that the relative
wage attab1ed through collective bargaining is a more valid indicator
of the union characteristic than is percent organized (Kochan & Block,
1977; Levinson, 1966).

The use of wage levels as an outcome assigns a

fixed numerical value to the union strength variable.

According to

Chamberlain (1951), union strength should not be quantified in this manner because it varies with the bargaining issue and the existing economic, social and political conditions.

Furthermore, unions appear to

increase wages more when first organized than later on (Rosen, 1969).
Thus a union may have more power over wage levels than other fringe
benefits or job security at a particular time, but this configuration
may change as the conditions surrormding the bargaining change {Hanuner,
1978).
When the purpose of study is to ascertain determinants of worker
attitudes, bargaining outcomes can serve as a measure of

~e

effec-

tiveness of the collective bargaining process in achieving favorable
terms and conditions of employment for workers (Kochan & Block, 1977).
Wages, fringe benefits and working conditions are ou·t comes of unioni-
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zation, a result in many cases of the use of power sources as well as
the collective bargaining process.

Outcomes are experienced directly

by union members, and it is the experience of the membership and not
the percent of \vorkers who are organized which should affect people • s
perceptions, attitudes and behaviors.

It is, therefore, more appro-

priate theoretically to use outcomes of w1ion membership as the operational definition of union strength (independffi1t variable} when one
examines the effects of unions on the individual worker because an outcome is closer to the dependent variables (attitudes, perceptions, job
satisfaction) in a causal chain than is a factor like percent organized
(Hammer, 1978).
In

the present study, a Contract Scale Index will be employed in

measuring union strength, which transforms bargaining outcomes to dollar
values (Kochan

&

Hh.eeler, 1975) .

When examining the potential influ-

ence of the union on employee attitudes and behaviors, it becomes clear
that one can not construct a network of hypotheses without knowing the
union in question.

Collective bargaining agreements differ from one

international union to another, as well as from one local to another
local within one international.

The union contract is a primary source

of information for examinu1g the effects of union characteristics when
the individual is the unit of analysis.
Union Strength-Employee Perceptions, Attitudes and Job Satisfaction
Hypotheses
As mentioned earlier, the right to unionize has come to mean pay
increases, better working conditions, job security and protection from
management (Chamberlain

&

Cullen, 1972; Rees, 1962) •

The stronger the
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union is the more able it should be to deliver these conditions to its
members (Seidman et al., 1958).

Cognitive dissonance theory suggests

that outcomes which are acquired through the investment of personal effort and costs (as in the case of the history of collective bargaining)
are highly valued (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger, 1957).

To union

members, collective bargaining outcomes are the results of such investments, and the greater the union gains the more these gains should be
valued or desired (Hammer, 1978).

Local union strength, as measured by

the relative hourly wage obtained through collective bargaining, has
been found to be related to the desirability of job outcomes which are
under total or partial control of the union, such as job security, pay
and the wish for respectful treatment from superiors (Hammer, 1978).
From this line of reasoning the following hypothesis was derived:
Hypothesis 1 - As union strength increases, outcomes under
union control (such as pay and job security) will be perceived ry union members as more desirable than factors not under
union control (such as creativity}.
Job s3tisfaction can be defined as an affective response of the
worker to his job and can be viewed as a result of consequence of the
worker's experience on the job in relation to his own values, that is,
what he wants cr expects from it (Smith, Hulin, & Kendall, 1969).

Since

job satisfaction is a partial result of the extent to which people receive valued outcomes and events from their job (Locke, 1976)/ it can
be postulated that union strength will be related to an individual's
satisfaction with those aspects of his job covered under the collective
bargaining agreement.

Kochan et al. (1975) found in their study of
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local union leaders and stewards that collective bargaining is seen as
most beneficial for the attainment of outcomes judged most important to
workers, such as wages and fringe benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure.
found a positive relationship between
wage) and pay satisfaction.

~ion

Hammer (1978)

strength (using relative

It is therefore postulated. that:

Hypothesis 2 - As union strength increases, union members
will be more satisfied with those aspects of their job which
are under partial control of the union (such as pay) than these
j?b factors not under union control (such as creativity).
The next step in the present study was to examine members' perceptions of chances for outcome attairrment.

In a study of white collar

workers, employees were asked about their desire for promotion 1 their
perceptio~

of chances of promotion, and their satisfaction with the job

(Stagner & Rosen,l969).

All of the employees reported a strong desire

for promotion, and those who thought their chances were good scored high
in jot satisfaction.
't~ere
t~des

Those who saw little chance of promotion, however,

dissatisfied - and in same cases, they expressed aggressive attitoward the employer (Stagner & Rosen, 1969).

~entioned,

As was 9reviously

collective bargaining is seen as beneficial for the attain-

ment of outcomes judged most important to \vorkers:

wages ru"'ld fringe

benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through
the grievance prccedure (Kochan Sc t~heeler, 1975) .

It is therefore

,postulated that:
Hypothesis 3 - As union 3trength

increases~ ~ember's

perceived opportur..ity of outcome attainment will be greater
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for those job factors under union control (such as pay}
than for those job factors not under union control (such
as creativity).
In sum, the present study focused on the possible impact which
local union strength or power can have on rnernbers 1 wants and needs in
their job, their beliefs in the probability of attaining what they want,
and job satisfaction.
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Method

Subjects
The subjects in the study were 248 full-time members of the Retail
Employees Union~

All the members were employed in the supermarket in-

dustry located in the northeastern part of the country.

The mean edu-

cational level for the groups was 12.1 years of academic schooling •
.He an age per group was 3 2. 3 years.

The mean number of union membership

years for the groups ranged from 6-10 years..

The subjects were ran-

domly selected within the three groups of union strength.

Procedure
Data were collected through the use of local union bargaining contracts, interviews with union officials and questionnaires distributed
to the members.
All attitudinal and perceptual variables were assessed through
questionnaires sent to the union members.

These were completed and re-

turned to the researcher in a self-addressed, pre-stamped envelope.
The cover page of

tl~e

questionnaire identified it as a tnesis research

project and the respondents were asked some background questions, such
as:

age, sex, educational level and local union membership years.

The

subjects were informed of the study through separate letters from the
president of each local union.

Information about confidential treatment

of responses was provided to all participants.
The 248 members wh.o returned data comprise 35 percent of the subjects scheduled for inclusion in the study.

The response rate across

tne locals ranged from 29 percent to 38 percent.
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Measures
Union strength was measured by the Contract Scale Index (Kochan &
vfueeler, 1975}.

The contracts used were those which the local unions

reached at the last collective bargaining settlement with the organization.
In the development of the Contract Scale Index, outcomes were

scored according to the degree they approached attainment of union bargaining goals.

As a result of the scaling of bargaining outcomes this

way, it becomes possible to interpret this analysis as a study of the
determinants of union bargaining effectiveness.

The coding scheme that

was devised for assigning scores to particular outcomes is

sho~m

in

Appendix A.
A total score was calculated for each contract by simply adding the
scores (assigned to each of the contract categories as listed in Appendix A) of those clauses contained in the particular contract.

This

total unweighted score forms the measure of bargaining outcomes which
is the operational definition of union strength used in the present
study.

Kochan and Wheeler (1975) have found that weighted measures

proved to be of no greater predictive value than simple unweighted measures.

The two measures were correlated very highly (r=.936).

This

Contract Scale Index makes it possible to compare local unions which
might differ in the kinds and amounts of bargaining outcomes

attain~d

along one dimension.
The members• feelings about work outcomes were assessed by asking
each subject in the questionnaire to rate, on a five-point, verbally
anclwred scale, the desirability of a set of possible outcomes, some
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under union control and others unrelated to union jurisdiction.

Percep-

tions of chances for outcome attainment were measured by having the subjects rate their chances of getting each of these outcomes, again on a
five-point scale where response alternatives will range from "no
chance" to "very good chance".

The questionnaire is shown in Appen-

dix B.

Job satisfaction was measured by the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQl

(Weiss, Dawis, England, & Loquist, 1967) .

Twelve scales

of the long form MSQ were chosen for the study, some of these job factors were under union control, otners were unrelated to union jurisdiction.

These scales included:

Achievement, Advancement, Company Poli-

cies and Practices, Compensation, Creativity, Recognition, SupervisionHuman Relations, Supervision-Technical, Working Conditions, Security,
Responsibility and Authority.
forcer in the work environment.

Each item in the MSQ refers to a reinThe respondent indicates how satisfied

he/she is with the reinforcer on the present job.
natives are presented for each item:

Five response alter-

"Very Dissatisfied; Dissatisfied;

Neither Dissatisfied nor Satisfied;. Satisfied; Very Satisfiedn.
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Results

Scores on the Contract Scale Index were calculated for each local
union and these total score values were rank ordered to form the high,
medium and low groups of union strength.

For each subject within these

three groups, scores on the MSQ and employee attitude survey were calculated.

These data were analyzed by an Analysis of Variance with Re-

peated Measures (ANOVR).

This procedure performs an analysis of vari-

ance on the one between subjects factor of union strength. and one within
subjects factor (repeated measures) of members 1 reactions.
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the
three groups 1 desirability of job-related outcomes.
the results of the 3x6

ru~OVR

testing hypothesis 1.

strength. was not found to be significant, F (2,245)
effect of job factors was found to be significant,
p.

< .01.

Table 2 presents
The effect of union

=
~

.45, p. "7 .05.
(5,1225)

=

The

94.79,

Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors

was found to be significant, E:_ (10,1225)

= 1.99, p. <. .05.

No apparent

difference between the means of the Low (3.62} Medium (3.60} and High
(3.51) Union Strength groups were found.

Although the union strength

by job factors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons
(Scheffe) showed no significant differences between levels of union
strength and any particular job factor.
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences
between members' ratings of desirability of outcomes with those job
factors under union control versus those job factors not under union
jurisdiction it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison.

The

Scheffe !vlultiple Comparison Method was applied to compare the means of
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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Desirability of
Job Related Outcomes

Job Factors

Adv

Pay

Sec

Cre

Rec

Ach

Low
Union
Strength

3.02
~- 20

4.07
.94

3.98
.94

3.56
1.14

3.22
1.13

3.89
1.03

Medium
Union
Strength

Q.99
1.30

4.15
.84

4.31
.74

3.28
1.28

2.98
1.24

3.88
1.03

High
Union
Strength

3.03
1.34

4. 29
• 65

3.96
1.22

3.24
1.27

2.79
1.38

3.73
1.09

3.01

4.18

4.15

3. 32

2.97

3.84

X

-

X

S.D.

--

X

S.D.
-

-X
S.D.
-
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Union Members
Desirability of Job Related Out'?ornes

Source

Union
Strength
Error
Job Factors
!Union Strength x
~ob Factors
~ror

*

p (.OS

** £.

<.01

ss
-

df

MS

-

F

3.19
865.06

2
245

1.595
3.53

.45

375.34

5

75.07

94.79**

15.73
970.09

10
1225

1.57
.79

1.99*

-

-
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the three job factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job Security) against those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity) ,
Recognition, Achievement) for any differences.

As predicted, the fac-

tors under union control were significantly greater, p ( .01 than those
factors not under union jurisdiction.
Tables 3 and 4 give the means and standard deviations for each of
the three groups' job satisfaction measures.

Table 5 presents the re-

sults of the 3x8 ANOVR for testing hypoULesis 2.
strength was not found to be

significant,~

effect of job factors was found to be
p < .01.

The effect of union

(2,245}

=

significant,~

.99,

p.~.05.

The

(7,1715} = 106.84,

Also, the interaction effect of union strength by job factors

was found to be significant,

~

(14,1715}

=

3.99,

p.<.ol.

No apparent

differences between the means of the Low (16.86), Medium (16.91) and
High (16.25) groups were found.

Although the union strength by job fac-

tors interaction was significant, post-hoc comparisons resulted in no
significant differences to be found between the levels of union strength
(low, medium, high) and any particular job factor.
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences

between members' ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors under union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction,
it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison.

The Scheff~Multi

ple Comparison Method was applied in the comparison of the means of the
four job factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Conditions, Advancement) against those factors not under union jurisdiction
(Creativity, Responsibility, Recognition, Achievement).

As predicted,

the factors under union control were significantly greater, £.<.01 than
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Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Job Satisfaction

Job Factors

Sec

Pay

we

Adv

Cre

Res

Rec

Ach

Low
Union
Strength

17.33
4.08

19.51
3.47

16.58
4.42

13 .. 87
5.19

16.16
5.37

17.13
4.47

15.67
5.88

18.67
4.37

1-iedium
Union
Strength

19.18
4.08

19.55
4.15

16.21
4.93

13.39
5.12

15.66
4.98

17.76
3.72

14.00
5.49

19.53
3.72

High
Union
Strength

16.79
5.22

20.21
3.73

17.68
4.30

12.20
5.34

14.95
5.23

16.61
4.54

13.28
6.01

18.28
4.59

18.12

19.75

16.72

13.12

15.53

17.30

14.08

19.00

X

X

S.D.

--X
S.D.

-

X

S.D.

19

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Job Satisfaction

Job Factors

Low
Union
Strength

Hedium
Union
Strength

High
Union
Strength

X

Sec

Pay

we

Adv

Aut

CCP

SHR

SSt

17.33
4.08

19.51
3.47

16.58
4.42

13.87
5.19

18.07
3.89

13.27
5.03

15.40
5. 26

15.64
5.17

19.18
4.08

19.55
4.15

16.21
4.93

13.39
5.12

18.57
3.61

13.16
4.93

14.43
5.10

15.00
4.54

16.79
5.22

20.21
3.73

17.68
4.30

12.20
5.34

17.41
4.39

11.76
4.87

12.89
5.38

14.45
4.91

18.12

19.75

16.72

13.12

18.12

12.76

14.14

14.96

-

X

S.D.

-

X

S.D.
-

-

X
S.D.

--
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Table 5

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Union Members Job
Satisfaction

Source

!Union
Strength
tError
P"ob Factors
~nion Strength x
P"ob Factors
[Error

*
**

p

p

<. 05
< . 01

-ss

-DF

176.39
21774.69

245

88.19
88.88

9416.29

7

1345.19

106.84**

703.93
21593.65

14
1715

50.28
12.59

3.99**

2

MS

-

F

-

• 99
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those factors not under union jurisdiction.

There was no significant

difference found between those factors under union control and the nonunion job factor of responsibility.
Table 6 presents the results of the 3x8 ANOVR for further testing
hypothesis 2.

The effect of union strength was again found not to be

significant, F (2,245)

=

1.30,

p~

.OS.

found to be significant, F (7,1715)

=

The effect of Job Factors was
129.87,

~<.01.

The interaction

effect of union strength by job factors was found to be significant,
F (14,1715)

=

4.04,

~<.01.

Again, no apparent differences between the

means of the Low (16.21), Medium (16.17) and High (15.46) groups was
found.

Post-hoc comparisons of the interaction revealed no significant

differences between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and
any particular job factor.
In order to further analyze the data pertaining to the differences
between members• ratings of job satisfaction with those job factors under union control versus those job factors not under union jurisdiction
it was necessary to carry out a post-hoc comparison.

The Scheff/Multi-

ple Comparison Method was applied comparing the means of the four job
factors under union control (Job Security, Pay, Working Conditions, Advancement} against those factors not under union jurisdiction

(Authorit~

Company Policies, Supervision-Human Relations, Supervision-Technical).
As predicted, those factors under union control were significantly
greater,£< .01 than those factors not under union control.
Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for each of the
three groups perceived probability of outcome attainment.

Table 8 rep-

resents the results of the 3x6 ANOVR for testing hypothesis 3.

The
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Table 6

Analysis of Variance with Repeated Measures of Subjects Job
Satisfaction

Source

Pnion
Strength
tError

218.67
20597.44

Job Factors
!Union Strength x
lrob Factors
Error

*
**

p
p

ss

<. 05

<.01

-df

-

-MS

F

-

2
245

109.34
84.07

11633.79

7

1661.97

129.87**

723.13
21947.59

14
1715

51.65
12.80

4.04**

.

1.30
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Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Union Members Perceived Probability
of Job-Related Outcome Attainment

Job Factors

Adv

p ay

s ec

c re

Union
Strength

2.76
1.47

3.45

3.71

1.39

.85

Medium
Union
Strength.

2.65

3.66

4.17

~.96

1.87

.. 80

2.47
~.39

3.83
1.36

3.80
1.22

2.61

3.67

3.98

c

Ah
c

2.96
1.73

3.09
1.36

3.64
1.23

2. 92
1 .. 58

2.80
1.44

3.83
1.29

2.64

2.56

1.50

1.33

3.37
1.40

2.84

2.78

3.66

Low

High
Union
Strength

X

-

X

S.D.

-

X

S.D.

-X
S.D.
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Table 8

Analysis of Variance

wi~

Repeated Measures of Union Members Perceived
Probability of Job-Related
Outcome Attainment

Source

Union
Strength
Error
P"ob Factors
Onion Strength x
Job Factors
Error

* E.<
** E_<:

.OS
.01

-ss

-df

-MS

-F

14.55
974.73

245

7.27
3.99

412.33

5

82.47

90.12**

24.89
1120.95

10

2.49
.92

2.72**

1225

2

1.83

25
effect of union strength was not found to be significant, F (2,245]
1.83,

!

~>.OS.

(5,1225}

=

The effect of job factors was found to be significant,
90.12, ~ ~.01.

Also, the interaction effect of union

strengtlL by job factors was found to be significant F (10,1225}
~(.01.

=

=

2.72,

No apparent differences between the means of the Low (3.27},

Medium (3.34} and High {3.11} groups were found.

Post-hoc comparisons

of the interaction revealed no significant differences between the levels of union strength (low, medium, high) and any particular job factor.
The Scheffe/~Iultiple Comparison Method was used to analyze the differences between members 1 ratings of perceived probability of outcome
attainment with those factors under union control (Advancement, Pay, Job
Security) versus those factors not under union jurisdiction (Creativity,
Recognition, Achievement} •
trol were significantly
union jurisdiction.

As predicted,

greater,~<

~~ose

factors under union con-

.01, than those factors not under
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Discussion and Conclusions

The present study examined the effects of a major union characteristic, union strength, and union members• ratings of desirability of
job-related outcomes, outcome attainment and job satisfaction.

In gen-

eral, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results of this
study:
(1)

The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and desirability of outcomes
under union control was partially supported.

{2)

The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and job satisfaction with
those aspects of mernber 1 s job under union control was
partially supported.

{3)

The hypothesis of a positive and significant relationship between union strength and outcome attainment of
factors under union control was partially supported.

The results of a nonsignificant effect between levels of union
strength in all three of the major hypotheses must be viewed in light of
several limitations.

First,

L~

sample was composed of only three local

unions, which forced a rank ordering (according to the Contract Scale
Index scores) into the high, medium and low groups of union strength.
Secondly, union strength was a factor of importance in this particular
study because the employer could bargain separately witlL each local
union.

Where bargaining has industry wide guidelines, as was found with

the retail store union workers, variations in outcome attainment from
collective bargaining between the local unions were not great enough for
this factor

(union strength} to have much impact.

Due to this situa-

tion, differences between local union strength groups were not found and
the interaction between levels of union strength with any particular job
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factor were not found.
The finding of a significant effect between the desirability of
outcomes under union control (Pay, Job Security, Advancement) against
those factors not under union control (Creativity, Recognition, Achievement) suggests that union members generally find job outcomes under
union control more desirable than those outcomes not under union jurisdiction.

This result is consistent with Hammer's (1978) study, which

found pay and job security more desirable with members than outcomes not
under union jurisdiction.
The finding of a significant effect between job satisfaction with
those aspects of the job under union control, versus those aspects of
the job not under union jurisdiction was generally supported.

Satisfac-

tion scores on the union controlled job factors of Pay, Advancement,
Working Conditions, and Job Security were significantly greater than
satisfaction scores on Creativity, Authority, Supervision-Technical,
Supervision-numan Relations, Recognition, Achievement and Company Policies (non-union factors).

Responsibility was the only non-union job

factor where no significant differences were found with union controlled
job factors.
gations:

These findings were consistent with several other investi-

Kochan and Wheeler (1975) found a significant effect between

collective bargaining and wages and fringe benefits, job security, working conditions and fair treatment through the grievance procedure;
Hammer (1978) found a positive relationship between union strength and
pay satisfaction.
The finding of a significant effect between perceived probability
of outcome attainment with those job factors u~der union control against
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those factors not under union jurisdiction suggests that union member's
generally perceive a fairly good chance of obtaining outcomes under
union control (Pay, Advancement, Job Security);

These results were con-

sistent with the findings of Hammer (1978) and Kochan and Wheeler (1975)
who found collective bargaining beneficial to the attainment of factors
under union jurisdiction (wages, benefits, job security, working conditions).
The results of this study suggested that characteristics of important work related organizations, such as unions, might have an impact on
workers' reactions to events in their work world.

This was borne out by

the fact that the workers in this study rated job factors under union
control more desirable than job factors not under union jurisdiction.
Job factors under union control were perceived by members as more likely
to be obtained on the job, and members expressed higher levels of jcb
satisfaction with job factors under union control than with those job
factors not under union jurisdiction.

Becuase the results were in the

expected direction, it seems worthwhile to conduct further investigations of these relationships in the future.

Perhaps using a larger num-

ber of local unions varying in bargaining outcomes would lead to a more
thorough investigation.

The overall conclusion of this study is that

the union is an important contributor to employees' perceptions and attitudes, and its effects on the individual worker deserve further attention.

Appendix A
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CONTRACT SCALE INDEX
The coding scheme for the analysis of the contrasts is specified below.

Each contract category was given a scale value according to the following schemata:
Cost of Living Allowance
0
1

=

no reference
cost of living clause

= some

Education Increments
0

=

no reference

1 = some provision

Merit Increments
0 = some provision
1 = no provision

Overtime Pay
0 = no reference
1
straight time pay or straight compensatory time off
2 = employee option for straight time cash or compensatory time off
3
1~ time pay (cash or compensatory time off)

=

=
=

1~

time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's
option)
5 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off)
6 = double-time pay (cash or compensatory time off at employee's
option)
4

Call Back Pay

=

no reference
1 = some provision for minimum number of hours paid
0

Shift Differentials
0
1

=
=

no reference
some provision

Meal Allowance
0 = no reference
1 = meal allowance
2 = meals supplied by employer

Mileage Allowance
0
1

=
=

no reference
some reference
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Length of Work Week

=

no reference
1 = 72 hours or more
2 = 64-71 hours
3 = 56-63 hours
4 = 48-55 hours
5 = 40-47 hours
0

Starting Salary
0

1

=
=

2 =
3 =

4 =
5 =
6 =
7 =
8 =
9 =

no reference
4,500-5,400
5,500-6,400
6,500-7,400
7,500-8,400
8,500-9,400
9,500-10,400
10,500-11,400
11,500-12,400
12,500+

Longevity Pay
0 = no provision
1 = some provision

Annual Increase in Wages
(first year of contract)
0 = no provision
1 = 1 to 3 percent
2 = 4 to 6 percent
3 = more than 6 percent

Sick Leave
0 = no reference
1 = some provision
Unused Sick Leave
0 = no provision
1 =some provision, e.g.,
accumulation allowed, cash
or compensatory time allowed
Death in Family Leave
0 = no reference
1 = some prov~s~on, employee
charged for sick leave
2 = some provision, no
charge to sick leave

Severance Pay
0
1

=
=

no reference
some reference

Family Medical Plan
0

=

1

=

2

=
=

3

no reference
employee pays total
premium
part paid by employer
total paid by employer

Education Costs Reimbursed
0

= no

1

=

2

=

reference
partial payment by
employer
total payment by
employer

Life Insurance

0 = no reference
= part paid by employer
2 = total paid by employer

1

Pensions
0 = no reference
1 = employer makes some
contributes to a pension fund; employee
contributes {contributary plan)
2 = noncontributary plan

Vacations
0 = no reference
1 = number of days vacation increases with
length of service
2 = number of days vacation decreases with
length of service
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Clothing Allowance
0 ::::: no reference
1 = cash allowance
2 ::::: furnished
Union Security
0
1
2

3
4

=

no reference

= maintenanc~ of membership
= agency shop
= modified union shop
= rmion shop

Payrole Deduction of Dues
0 = no reference
1 = employer deducts dues;

2

=

union charged fee
employer deducts dues;
no charge to union

Holidays
0 = no reference
1 = five days or less
2 =.5~-7 days

3
4
5

0
1

=
=

2

=

3

=

4

=

no reference
time off for grievances
of negotiations
time off for union
seminars or conventions
time off for all union
business
union has full-time
paid staff representation

Bulletin Boards
0
1

=
=

2

=

3

=

no provision
employer may edit or must
approve material
employer supplies space
for boards
employer furnishes boards

Management Rights
0

=

l

=

some management rights
clause in the contract
no management rights
clause in the contract

Union Members Retain Prevailing
Rights
0 = no provision
l = some provision

7~-9
9~-11
11~+

days
days
days

Compensation for on-the-job
Injury

0 = no reference
1 = state workmen 1 s
compensation
2 = some prov1s1on in
addition to workmen•s
compensation
Jury or Witness Pay

=

no reference
1 = some provision

0

Time Off for Union Business

=
=
=

Leave of Absence

=

no reference
1 = some provision
0

Vacancies-Promotions

=

0
1

=

2

=

3

=

no reference
decision of the store
manager
decision of the district manager
by procedures in the
contract

Safety and Health
0

=

1

=

no reference
some provision

Shift Exchange
0
1

= no reference
= permission of

2

= modification

3

=

manage-

ment required
of management required
reference - no requirement for notification or permission
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Rules and Regulations

= prior

0

established rules
prevail
= no provision
= contract prevails over
rules
= contract prevails over
prior rules and rules
are subject to grievance
procedure
= rules must be mutually
agreed to in bargaining

1
2
3

4

Parking

Lot

Grievance Procedure
0 = no reference
1 = final step rests
in store manager
2 = final step rests in
3

4 =

No-Strike Provision
0

0 = no reference
1 = same provision

=

=a

1 =

Community Services Program
0 = no reference
1 = some provision

district manager
final step is ad visory arbitration
final step is binding
arbitration

no-strLke clause
is written in the
contract
a no-strike clause
is not written in
the contract

Impasse Procedure
(for impasses that arise in
future contract negotiations)

Union Representation
0 = no reference
1 = representation rights

2

=

other than exclusive
exclusive representation
rights

0 = no reference
1 = mediation
2 =

3
4

::::::

::::::

factfinding
advisory arbitration
binding arbitration

Working out of Classification
Type of Agreement
0
1

= none

0
1

::::::

2
3

=
=

agree to adopt to
ordinance
memo of understanding
labor agreement

0
1
2

= no reference
= statement of policy

= affirmative

vided
Clean Up Time
0
1

Nondiscrimination

action

= no reference
= acting rank pay

= no reference
= some provision

Savings Clause
0
1

= no reference
= some reference

pro-
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EMPLOYEE ATTITUDE SURVEY

HOW TO ANSWER: After reading each statement, circle the number that
best describes how desirable the following job factors are to you.
~

0

t:£1

~
~

~

~

~

H

~

Ul

~

~

~

:>

t-4

H

Ul~

t:£1...::1

~

Q~~

m

~~H

Cl

s

ril

H

t:£1
0

~

~

t:£/H~

~

H

m
~

Q

~

tx:

:z

H~Ul

~0~

g;

:::::>

l.

The chance for advancement on my job.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

The chance to try out some of my own ideas.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

The amount of pay I receive.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

The way my job provides for steady employment.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

The praise I get for doing a good job.

1

2

3

4

.5

6.

The feeling of accomplishment I get from the
1

2

3 . 4

5

job.

HOW TO ANSWER:
After reading each statement, circle the number that
best describes your perceived chance of obtaining the following job
factors.
t:£1

0

w

~

0

0

8t'J

n

0

~
0

fjtjU

0

H

t-4UUl

~~~0

~~~~
~o~u

:z:

~~8~

1.

The opportunity for advancement on my job.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

The opportunity to try my own methods of doing
the job.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

The opportunity to earn adequate pay increases.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

My job provides for steady future employment.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

My job provides recognition for doing a good
job.

1

2

3

4

5

My work provides me with a sense of achievement. 1

2

3

4

5

6.
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